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COMMENT ON "WHAT COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
PROMISES AND WHAT IT DOES"
George W. Brooks
There can be no disagreement with Professor Jensen's position 
that a belief in freedom is at the heart of our commitment to collec­
tive bargaining. These comments are a footnote to what he says about 
institutional accommodation and freedom in associations. My point 
is that acceptable "institutional accommodation" is achieved only 
when the institutions themselves do, in fact, offer choices to 
individuals and thus give freedom its essential meaning.
But, in fact, there seems to be an opposite tendency, a growing 
disposition on the part of unions and collective bargaining institutions 
to withdraw from workers freedoms which were once considered essential 
to the effective operation of those institutions. Too much "freedom" 
for individual union members, it is said, becomes inconsistent with 
the public interest in industrial stability. Union leaders assert 
that the union automatically protects the interests of the members, 
and that "too much" freedom is not even in the members' interest.
This view has no support in the history of the National Labor 
Relations Act. The act established freedom of choice for individual 
workers as the keystone of federal labor relations policy:
Section 7. Employees shall have the right to 
self organization, to form, to join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, 
and to engage in concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection.
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This was enlarged in the Taft-Hartley revision of Section 7 
which added: "and shall also have the right to refrain from any or 
all such activities except to the extent that such right may be 
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization 
as a condition of employment."
Some limitations on individual freedom of choice were 
acknowledged as necessary at the outset. Exclusive representation 
is an example; the union chosen in a secret ballot by a majority of 
those who voted was to be the representative not only of that majority, 
but equally of those who voted against the union and those who did 
not vote at all. No one who lived through the thirties can remember 
having any doubts about the validity of this relatively new notion.
The existence of employer anti-unionism on an overwhelming scale was 
persuasive and overrode the objections of those people who asserted 
at the time that it was an unreasonable denial of free choice.
Similarly, the primary justification for the closed or union 
shop was employer anti-unionism. The very survival of a union, 
expecially in manufacturing, depended upon its ability to negotiate 
a form of compulsory unionism as part of its contractual relationship. 
In the absence of such provision, the employer could peck away at the 
union's strength, hire anti-union employees, and frighten or bribe 
enough others to convert a union majority into a minority.
In this friendly and sympathetic audience, may I suggest that 
this line of argument no longer has the same validity? In most 
organized industries, the employer is not anti-union. What therefore 
began as a weapon of the union against an anti-union employer has 
become a weapon wielded by the employer on the union's behalf against 
the employees who are unwilling to become members of, or pay dues to, 
the union. Many union leaders, among them the late John P. Burke, 
president of the Pulp, Sulphite and Paper Mill Workers, regretted the
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necessity of the union shop on the ground that it destroys the 
essential qualities of unionism by changing the relationship between 
leaders and led. Meanwhile, the official justification of compulsory 
unionism has switched to the "free rider" argument, a position of 
quite a different order.
It is important to remember that anti-unionism is not entirely 
a thing of the past-textiles comes quickly to mind. Here some form 
of compulsory unionism is still necessary. You will be happy to know 
there is an answer to this problem, too, one that I call the Pharaoh 
Plan. It would permit unions to negotiate a union shop during the 
first seven years of a contractual relationship, after which all forms 
of compulsory unionism would be automatically cancelled. In almost 
every case, seven years is a long enough period for union and employer 
to learn to get along together, after which the union can revert to 
its normal role of bringing members into the union by persuasion, 
precept, and good behavior. Unions would not suffer serious 
consequences except that it might become difficult to raise per 
capita tax and dues.
I do not mean to ignore Professor Jensen's comment on compulsory 
unionism, but his parallel with seniority seems to be strained. For 
the most part, seniority is a bulwark of freedom, not a restriction 
on it.
As noted above, exclusive representation and forms of compulsory 
unionism were built into the industrial relations system at the 
beginning of our present era. By themselves, they might not have had 
deleterious effects. But since the thirties, public and private 
policy have carried us to the point where employee freedom of choice 
has been seriously eroded by union and employer, by decision of the 
NLRB, and by decisions of the courts. The collective effect is awesome.
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First, the union shop now flourishes in large sections of 
American industry where employers are no longer actively 
attempting to eliminate unions from their plants. The historical 
justification is absent, and union officers are relieved of the 
necessity of persuading employees that it is to their interest to 
maintain union membership. Second, all affiliated unions are 
prohibited by the AFL-CIO no-raid policy from seeking to represent 
dissatisfied employees in an NLRB election if the employees are 
already represented by another affiliated union. Unions, like 
employers, abhor competition.
Third, decisions of the National Labor Relations Board prevent 
any changes of representation or decertification of unions already 
certified in plants which have become part of multi pi ant or multi- 
employer bargaining units. Employees in a large steel company or a 
basic auto company, dissatisfied with their union, cannot get an 
election, even if there were a union willing to petition on their 
behalf. The union would have an impossible task of getting the 
necessary showing of interest from all the plants in dozens of states 
across the land.
Union officers and staff prefer multi pi ant agreements. They are 
a rallying point for allegations of bargaining strength, which may or 
may not be well founded. More important, multipi ant agreements are 
attractive because they are a means of locking workers into bargaining 
units from which there is no escape.
Another line of NLRB decisions prevents skilled tradesmen in 
manufacturing plants from getting separate units, either in new 
organizing or in severance from existing industrial units. An 
undesirable compression of skill differential in wage rates is 
taking place at the same time that industrial unions and the NLRB
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cut off any avenues of recourse. The experience of skilled workers 
in autos is devastating evidence. Dissatisfied with UAW representation, 
they tried to get separate representation through independent unions 
which had notable success in organizing, especially in the Detroit 
area. Threatened with the possible loss of these workers, the UAW 
amended its constitution to give skilled workers an apparent veto 
over agreements. Later, the NLRB refused to conduct elections for 
the skilled workers because of an inadequate showing of interest 
on a company-wide basis. Adding insult to injury, board staff 
expressed the view that the skilled workers were adequately represented.
The skilled workers then found that the were not protected by 
the constitution. At Ford Motor Company they rejected an agreement 
overwhelmingly, only to see the agreement signed on the basis of the 
production workers' acceptance of it. With the threat of a rival 
union removed by the NLRB, the UAW Executive Board decided that the 
convention had not given the skilled workers a "veto," and the UAW 
Public Review Board upheld the UAW Executive Board's decision.
There is no avenue of relief.
Another NLRB withdrawal of free choice is the increased period 
of time in which contracts are treated as a bar to representation 
challenge by employees who want to change unions or decertify a union. 
The law established a one-year bar to permit the parties to accommodate 
to each other. The board lengthened the period from one to two years 
and later to three. The parties--union and employer--have persuaded 
the board the three-year contract bar is an aid to industrial stability. 
It is also an effective means of making change of representation 
difficult.
All of these changes reflect the common interest of the vice- 
president for industrial relations and the officer of the union. In 
the light of the problems with which the National Labor Relations Act
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was supposed to deal, is it not significant that the spokesmen for 
both sides agree so completely on the changes? All the changes 
reflect the understandable desire of company and union 
representatives to avoid complications that arise from giving 
employees freedom of choice. I could add personal testimony about 
the frustration of finding the already difficult process of arriving 
at an agreement complicated by rival union petitions, decertification 
petitions, or those damned troublemakers who somehow failed to 
understand how skillfully and conscientiously I represented them, and 
how much better my judgment was than theirs. So I am not being 
critical of labor or management for trying to minimize their problems. 
But why should the rest of society look with equanimity on the 
withdrawal of free choice from employees? It is being accomplished 
through the joint action of the presumed adversaries at the bargaining 
table. It is difficult in such circumstances to share Professor 
Jensen's belief in the efficacy of pluralism or countervailing power.
The courts have meanwhile made their own contribution to 
withdrawal of free choice in their treatment of union fines. 
Historically, unions have disciplined members through expulsion and 
fines, but only recently has the Supreme Court sanctioned the collection 
of union fines through the courts. In industrial unions expulsion lost 
its terror when the Taft-Hartley Act made it illegal for an employer 
to discharge employees under a union shop for anything except failure 
to pay customary dues and initiation fees. Thus, had the UAW merely 
expelled the workers who went through a picket line at Allis-Chalmers, 
the offenders would have greeted the action with joy, being free from 
the obligation to pay dues. The issues are too complex for discussion 
here, but everyone agrees that the possibility that a fine will be 
imposed and collected in the courts has a chilling effect on opposition 
of all kinds inside the unions.
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By way of summing up, consider the plight of the man or woman 
who goes to work in a bargaining unit job at the U.S. Steel Corporation. 
The personnel director tells him that as a condition of employment 
he must join the United Steelworkers of America. As long as he is 
employed by the company, he will pay whatever dues have been set at 
the USA convention and will have seen them climb to their present 
level of twice his hourly rate. If he becomes dissatisfied with USA 
representation, he can form an opposition, but the chances of success 
in replacing the USA or decertifying it will depend upon his being 
able to muster a petition signed by 30 percent of all the employees 
in the entire corporation! No one could possibly take on this task 
except, conceivably, another well-heeled union. But this action is 
forbidden by the AFL-CIO Constitution. If, in his frustration, he 
goes through a picket line or does one of a number of other things the 
union does not like, the employee can be fined and taken to court if 
he refuses to pay.
This is not intended as a catalogue of horrors. The develop­
ments I have discussed have essential places in labor relations 
history, except for the NLRB multiplant and craft unit rulings.
What is important is the collective effect of all these restrictions, 
which must concern Professor Jensen and all of us who hope for the 
best in industrial relations.
